Glossary | 17-19 June Messages | Message Tables | U.S. Messages page

1030Z 18 June 1967 transmitted message text from
U.S. Defense Attache Office, Tel Aviv to
White House and
Office of Secretary of Defense and
Chief of Naval Operations and
Department of State and others

P 181030Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO WHITE HOUSE
OSD
CNO
DEPT STATE
COMSIXTHFLT
CINCSTRIKE
CINCNAVEUR
JCS
INFO DIA
USUN
CINCEUR-USEUCOM
CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
USAFE
CINCUSAEUR
CTG SIX ZERO
USDAO LONDON
USDAO PARIS
USDAO MOSCOW
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67
SECTION I OF II.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO
GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWING:
   A. GEN RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR
THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
   B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE
FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT
YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
   C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT
OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED
TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS
TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRAT'S ORAL PRESENTATION
IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
   "A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE
EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON
USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE. THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.
   B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH
BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND
AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS
BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE
BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO
AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY
UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR
THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE
IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT
LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH.
THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF
SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE
REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.
   SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT
ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS
STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN
LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED
FROM JAMES FIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE
UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE
WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE
IDENTIFICATION.
3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDF NAVY STANDARD ORDERS, AN ENEMY SHIP
IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIP OR SHELLING THE
ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN
THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE
DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE
CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WAS
FIXED AT 28 TO 30 KNOTS, THE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK
WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO
ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVY OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE
MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTY'S SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND
ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED
RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF
POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHING THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN
IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF
CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE.
IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF
A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS
MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE
THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR
MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STANDING
ORDER SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND
IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.
   THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK
ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOES FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP
EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY
WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER
ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY
DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN
OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY
BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP.
IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV
THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO
THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C.O. OF THE
MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A
DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MERCHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE
CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I
(AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND
DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
BT
[repeat DTG and header info]
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/2 JUN 67
FINAL SECTION OF II.
   (1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO
IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY.
(3) IT APPEARD TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORE-
CASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S.
THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF
ACTION.
   IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN
THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT,
APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS,
A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR.
ONE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS
IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A
GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE
MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS
QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG
WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A
GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN
AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL
KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS
WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT
IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP
MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FROM A DISTANCE;
SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORES AND
WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY
BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY
FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S.
FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO
HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS
DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATTACKED BY THE AF AND LATER
BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD
ITS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP. END QUOTE.
COMMENTS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS
TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.
2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE
GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM THE USG SAYING THAT LIBERTY HAD
BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE
HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.
3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND
INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE
FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS
QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD
THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF
DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:
   A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT
MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.
   B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY
CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE
UNIDENTIFIED [SHIP] WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE
THOUGHT IT WAS LIBERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY
IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS,
FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE
BEEN LIBERTY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL
QUSEIR.
   C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER
COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOT SHIP IS DIFFICULT
TO ACCEPT.
   D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO
IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN
RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT
NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA
REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE
INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY
OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA
WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
BT

Message subject lineage: 210920Z JUN 67 USDAO TEL AVIV

Message displayed as Document 307 in the Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, Johnson Administration, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967.

Glossary | 17-19 June Messages | Message Tables | U.S. Messages page