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SUMMARY OF EVENTS

On 10 June 1967 Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, ordered a Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967. The Court consisted of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, President, and the additional members Captain Bernard J. Lauff, USN, and Captain Bert M. Atkinson, Jr., USN. Captain Ward Boston, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Allen Feingersch, USN, were designated to serve as counsel and assistant counsel for the Court respectively.

The Court was directed to inquire into all the pertinent facts and circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack; damage resulting therefrom; and deaths of and injuries to naval personnel. The Court was directed to submit its findings of fact.

Pursuant to the direction of the convening authority, the Court conducted its proceedings in closed session. The Court met for the first time at 2314, 10 June 1967. Before the Court closed on 16 June 1967 in order to deliberate and prepare its findings of fact it had taken the testimony of 19 witnesses and received as exhibits 49 separate offers.

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It has been determined that a separate ad hoc factfinding team with Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA, as head, was appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the circumstances relating to the command and control and communications actions and procedures associated with the events during the period 1-8 June 1967 which culminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY, 8 June 1967. The factfinding team was directed to ascertain the adequacy of the command and control and communications arrangements involved in the operational control of USS LIBERTY and accomplishment of her mission, to include:

- a. The manner in which command and control of LIBERTY was being exercised.
- b. The normal system for exercising command and control versus that which was in effect at the time of the incident, if different.
- c. The specific orders issued to LIBERTY between 1-8 June and the orders to which LIBERTY responded during the same period.
- d. Circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in the receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their non-receipt.

This team was directed to report its findings together with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

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findings and recommendations of this JCS factfinding team are not included in this summary.

It has also been determined that a preliminary inquiry into this incident has also been conducted within the Israeli Government. The findings of this inquiry were forwarded by the U. S. Defense Attache Office, Tel Aviv, Israel on 14 August 1967 to the Chief of Naval Operations. The findings of the Israeli preliminary inquiry are not included in this summary. It is to be noted, however, that the report does reflect that USS LIBERTY was identified by Israeli Defense Forces as a U. S. Navy vessel earlier on the day of the attack and that the lack of knowledge of this identification on the part of the immediate commanders of the attacking Israeli air and sea forces led to the tragic incident.

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Attached to this summary as Appendices A through E are the following documents to insure completeness of the record:

1. CINCUSNAVEUR msg dtg 231620Z of June 67 to USCINCEUR (C) (Appendix A)
2. EXASST to CNO memo, OP-002;tr, OP-00 memo 000365-67 of 7 Jul 67 w/4 encls; subj: USS LIBERTY Court of Inquiry; addenda to (TS) (Appendix B)

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3. List of deceased personnel from USS LIBERTY with copies of Certificate of Death NAVMED N (Rev 4-58) for each deceased (U) (Appendix C)
4. List of all injured personnel from USS LIBERTY with diagnosis and prognosis and copies of treatment record (U) (Appendix D)
5. Copy of ltr of Commander NavShipSysCom, AGTR-5 Ser. 527-1450 of 1 Sept 67 concerning estimated cost of repairs to USS LIBERTY (U) (Appendix E)

LIBERTY OPERATIONS 24 May 1967 - 8 June 1967

LIBERTY, under the command of Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, 494464/1100, departed ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, at 0530Z, 24 May 1967 pursuant to orders from Commander, Service Squadron Eight (COMSERVRON EIGHT msg dtg 0240020Z, May 1967) which directed LIBERTY to proceed to ROTA Spain at best possible speed of advance (SOA). OPCON was to be shifted from CINCLANTFLT to USCINCEUR upon LIBERTY passing the sea buoy inbound to ROTA on 31 May 1967; upon assuming OPCON, USCINCEUR was requested to make preparations for the extended deployment of LIBERTY in the Eastern Mediterranean in accordance with a schedule to be passed ASAP (JCS msg dtg 291602Z, May 1967).

LIBERTY's operating schedule was set forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z, June 1967, which in pertinent part ordered LIBERTY to

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(1) depart ROTA Spain on 2 June, (2) during the period 2-8 June, proceed enroute via Gibraltar Strait to a position 32-00N, 33-00E via the northern African coastal route with 13 nautical miles as the closest point of approach (CPA) to the UAR, and (3) during the period 9-30 June, conduct operations south of 32-00N and between 33-00E and 34-00E. While conducting these operations, the CPA to the UAR and Israel were to be 12, 5 and 6.5 nautical miles respectively.

LIBERTY message dtg 010712Z of June 1967 advised its ETA in ROTA as 010845Z and that it would chop to CINCUSNAVEUR at 010901Z without report. In CINCUSNAVEUR message dtg 020717Z, June 1967, LIBERTY was directed when RFS 2 June, to depart ROTA and proceed in accordance with the JCS directed operating schedule. LIBERTY advised CINCUSNAVEUR that departure from ROTA would be at 021230Z and that she would proceed at best speed in accordance with the operating schedule (LIBERTY msg dtg 011305Z June 67). By message dtg 022108Z June 1967, to CINCUSNAVEUR, LIBERTY announced its departure from ROTA at 021230Z and that its ETA on station was 080300Z. LIBERTY sitreps on 3 and 4 June reported the following: (1) LIBERTY message dtg 032028Z reported an 032400Z

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position of 37-10N1 004-03E7, PIM (Point of intended movement) coastal easterly of 15 knots, (2) LIBERTY message dtg 042050Z June 1967 reported an 042400Z position of 37-22N4 011-15E8, PIM 12-16 until 050130Z thence 106/15. These two messages were received at the U. S. Communications Station, Morocco but there was no evidence that the Communications Station refilled these messages into common user channels for onward delivery. LIBERTY message dtg 051934Z June 1967 reported an 052400Z position of 35-20N 19-11E, PIM of 106/115, and that LIBERTY had assumed condition readiness three-modified. Condition readiness three-modified meant that LIBERTY had her normal steaming watch on deck, plus one man standing by the forward gun mounts. LIBERTY carried two pedestal mounted .50 cal. Browning Machine Guns on her fore-castle and identical mounts on either side of the deck-house aft of the bridge. Under "modified condition three", bridge lookouts would man the two after guns until the crew manned general quarters. By its message dtg 062036Z, LIBERTY stated it would be reporting to the OPCON of COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z, and further advised that its armament consisted of four .50 caliber machine guns. COMSIXTHFLT directed LIBERTY to conduct operations as previously directed but

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advised LIBERTY that in view of the then present Arab/Israeli situation and the unpredictability of the UAR actions, to maintain a high state of vigilance against attack or threat of attack and to advise if the local situation dictated a change in the area of operations (COMSIXTHFLT msg dtg 062349Z June 1967). In its message dtg 070908Z LIBERTY reported on 070800Z position of 33-06N 28-54E PIM 109/16.5 until 072300Z, thence stationary within 30 nautical miles of 31-45N 33-30E. The final sitrep of LIBERTY reported an 080800Z position of 31-45N 33-30E PIM within 30 nautical miles of the above position. (LIBERTY msg dtg 080800Z). This reported operating area was within the operating areas set forth in JCS message dtg 011545Z -- the latest guidance received by LIBERTY prior to the attack.

The following three messages which modified LIBERTY's area of operation were not received by the ship prior to the attack: (1) JCS message dtg 072230Z, (2) JCS message dtg 080110Z, and (3) COM SIXTHFLT message dtg 080917Z. The facts relating to the non-delivery of these three messages as indicated in the Court of Inquiry are summarized hereafter.

LIBERTY OPERATIONS on 8 June 1967 (All Times are BRAVO)

The projected operations of LIBERTY on the morning and afternoon of 8 June were to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the UAR

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Coast at 31-27.2N 34-00E (Point Alfa) thence to 31-22.3N 33-42E (Point Bravo), thence to 31-31N 33-00E (Point Charlie) retracing this track until new orders were received. If fixes could not be obtained accurately as Point Charlie was approached, it was intended to head due north until the 100 fathom curve was crossed and the track moved to the north to more or less move back and forth on the general average of the 100 fathom curve. The normal steaming speed was to be five knots. Normal steaming colors were flown and there was no intention to steam at darken ship. At 0754 LIBERTY was steaming on a course of 130°T at a speed of 10 knots. At 0849, LIBERTY passed through Point ALFA and changed course to 253°T. At 0905, speed was decreased to 5 knots. Point Bravo was passed at 1132 and the ship's course was changed to 283°T.

OVERFLIGHTS OF LIBERTY ON 8 June 1967 PRIOR TO THE ATTACK

There were a number of overflights of LIBERTY by unidentified aircraft prior to the attack on 8 June 1967. The first overflight occurred at 0515 -- after sunrise. Although no markings or insignia were seen, this aircraft was noted to have a double fuselage -- looking somewhat "like an old P-38 or a small flying boxcar" (Record, p. 60).

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This plane circled about three or four times off the port beam and then took off in a true direction toward Tel Aviv. At 0850 a single jet crossed astern of the ship at a distance of approximately three to five miles. This aircraft circled the ship from starboard to port and returned to the mainland in the direction of the UAR. A "locating two" message was transmitted on this sighting -- LIBERTY message dtg 080742Z. At about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship three times at about 10,000 feet and at a distance of approximately two miles. At about 1056 an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. This plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai Peninsula. Overflights by aircraft similar in configuration to the American "flying boxcar" (C-119) occurred at about 1145, 1220 and 1245. During the 1145 and 1245 flights the ensign was specifically noted to be flying from the foremast, and, due to a slight breeze, was extended. It has been determined that the NORD 2501 of which the Israeli Government has 34, is a twin fuselage plane similar in appearance to the American "flying boxcar".

#### AIR ATTACK ON LIBERTY

At 1132, LIBERTY passed Point Bravo and changed course to 283° T. At 1348 the ship secured from general quarters drill.

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1351, while on a course of 283°T, three small surface contacts at a range of 32,200 yards and a bearing of 082°T were picked up on LIBERTY radar. This contact was reported to the bridge. The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and the Officer of the Deck were on the bridge at the time. At 1353 radar reported possible aircraft passing over the surface contacts. At 1358 a single aircraft was sighted approaching the ship from 135° relative at an altitude of approximately 7,000 and at a distance of approximately 5-6 miles from the ship. This aircraft was noticed to have similar if not identical characteristics to the jet aircraft which had orbited the ship at 1030. LIBERTY received no communications from this aircraft nor did it attempt to transmit any to the aircraft. The Commanding Officer directed the Officer of the Deck to call the forward gun mounts stating he believed the aircraft were going to attack. The Officer of the Deck tried unsuccessfully three times to raise the forward mounts. One aircraft passed down track of the ship, and at about 1403 there was a loud explosion -- portside amidship. Prior to the attack, at about 1400, the Commanding Officer personally sighted the minaret at El Arish at a bearing of 142° from the ship and range determined from radar of 25.5 miles. Prior to the air attack there was no fire directed from LIBERTY at any of the aircraft. Immediately following the

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explosion, the Commanding Officer ordered general quarters and signalled all ahead flank on the engine order telegraph. Between 1405 and 1410 LIBERTY was under repeated air attack with two or more aircraft making between 6-8 coordinated strafing, rocket and incendiary runs over the ship. The attacks were made in a criss-cross fashion over the ship with each attack coming at approximately 45-second to one-minute intervals. These attacks caused three major fires topside covering large areas of the ship with flames and smoke. Two 55 gallon gasoline drums on the portside 01 level and a motor whaleboat on the starboard side on the 02 level aft of the bridge were set ablaze. In addition, the public address system, the 21 MC and most sound-powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the first of the attack. While the air attack was in progress and despite a severe leg injury from shrapnel, the Commanding Officer obtained a camera from the safe on the bridge and commenced photographing the attacking aircraft and later the motor torpedo boats engaged in the strafing and torpedo attack.

#### SURFACE ATTACK ON LIBERTY

During the latter moments of the air attack three motor torpedo boats (MTB's) were noted to be approaching the ship from the northeast

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on a relative bearing of approximately  $135^{\circ}$  at a distance of about 15 miles. LIBERTY was on a course of  $283^{\circ}$ T at a speed in excess of five knots. The boats were in wedge formation, 150-200 yards apart, with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Their speed was estimated at 27-30 knots. Since they appeared to be coming in a torpedo launch attitude, the Commanding Officer directed mount 51 to take the boats under fire. He also noticed that the normal steaming ensign had been shot away during the air attack and ordered a second ensign to be hoisted from the yardarm. A holiday size ensign was hoisted on the port yardarm. It has been determined that the size of this flag was 7 x 13 feet. The Commanding Officer alerted the crew to standby for a torpedo attack from the starboard side. LIBERTY continued on a course of  $283^{\circ}$ T at maximum speed. At about 1428 when the boats were approximately 2,000 yards from LIBERTY, there appeared to be signalling from the center boat. It also appeared to the Commanding Officer that this boat was flying an Israeli flag. Because of the intermittent blocking of the view by smoke and flames, it was not possible to read the signals of the boat and no signals were transmitted from LIBERTY due to the fact that the starboard searchlight had been destroyed in the air attack. In view of the possibility

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that the attacking aircraft were Israeli and the attack was conducted in error, the Commanding Officer yelled to mount 51 to hold fire. However the order was apparently not received and at about 1431, mount 51 fired a short burst at the boats. As soon as mount 51 opened fire, mount 53 began firing at the center boat. Mount 53's fire was described as extremely effective and blanketing the area and the center torpedo boat. Simultaneous with the firing from mounts 51 and 53, the MTB's commenced strafing the starboard side of LIBERTY. The flames from the burning whaleboat made it impossible to approach mount 53 from the starboard wing. The Commanding Officer ordered Ensign Lucas around the portside of the bridge to get machine gun 53 to cease fire. Simultaneously the Commanding Officer passed the word to standby for a torpedo attack. Ensign Lucas returned and stated he saw no one at mount 53. At 1434 a torpedo passed 75 yards astern of LIBERTY. At 1435 a torpedo struck the starboard side of LIBERTY amidship. The torpedo hit caused no major fires but the blast caused a loss of electrical power throughout the ship, and a 9° starboard list. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water with all power and steering control lost. Engines and boilers were secured at 1436. The torpedo struck the research coordination center. These spaces flooded instantly. The condition of the remains recovered from this space indicated that death was instantaneous.

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ACTIVITIES OF MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AFTER ATTACK

Immediately after the ship was struck by a torpedo, the MTB's stopped dead in the water and milled around astern at a distance of approximately 5-800 feet from LIBERTY. One of the MTB's was seen to have a hull number of 206-17. One of the boats started signalling the ship. Code Lima India signifying that the ship was not under command was hoisted by LIBERTY. Using a hand-held Aldis lamp, LIBERTY signalled "U. S. Naval Ship". The MTB then sent in English "Do you need help?" followed by "Do you want us to standby?" The LIBERTY reply to both inquiries was in the negative. The MTB then came up to the portside and flashed "Good Luck" and returned astern to join the other two boats. At about 1505 the MTB's retired towards shore to a range of about five miles. At about 1507 a helicopter bearing the Star of David approached LIBERTY from the portside and hovered at a distance of about 500 yards. A second helicopter approached the ship at 1508. The markings on these helicopters were 04 and 08 or D4 and D8 respectively. Passes were made around and over the ship but they were not observed to pick up bodies, persons or debris. At 1536, the MTB's which had departed again headed towards the ship at high speed. The order to standby for torpedoes was again given. No attacks occurred and the MTB's departed. Between 1536 and 1710

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the MTB's returned to the ship several times. By 1713 they had retired out of sight over the horizon. At about 1615, two unidentified jet aircraft approached the ship from the starboard side and reconnoitered from a distance. At about 1845 an Israeli helicopter circled close to LIBERTY and attempted to signal. The craft appeared desirous of landing, but the Commanding Officer ruled out a landing as too hazardous. Repeated attempts to communicate with the helicopter were unsuccessful. At 1852 a message packet was dropped on the fore-castle. The message written on a calling card of the U. S. Naval Attache, Tel Aviv asked "Have you casualties?". LIBERTY attempted by several means to communicate that there were many casualties, but there was no indication that the message was understood. The helicopter departed shortly after sunset -- about 1905.

MESSAGES OF 7 AND 8 JUNE ORDERING CHANGES OF LIBERTY OPERATIONS

Means and time of transmission and handling of several messages are of importance in the sequence of events leading up to the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Included in the record of the Court of Inquiry are evidence and testimony to the effect that from 1 June and until and during the attack on LIBERTY, communications systems concerned were

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inundated with large numbers of messages many of which were of high precedence. The messages discussed below were competing with this flood of messages for the available capacity of message handling systems and talents of the personnel involved.

LIBERTY was, on 8 June 1967, copying the JRTT Broadcast originating from U. S. Naval Communications Station, Asmara and the XRI Broadcast originating from U. S. Naval Communications Station, Greece. The former broadcast was LIBERTY's primary means of receipt of general service messages and the latter its primary means of receipt of messages pertaining to its research mission. LIBERTY had been copying JRTT since 070001Z June and prior to that time had been copying the KRTT Broadcast, keyed from Morocco. Each of these broadcasts is crypte covered. Physical locations of the broadcast terminals and communications files in LIBERTY were in the research spaces, the area in which the torpedo hit. These files were not available to the Court since they were largely destroyed.

JCS priority precedence message 7337 072230Z June 1967, addressed to USCINCEUR for action and LIBERTY, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR and others for information, stated that LIBERTY's previously assigned operating area (JCS 6724 011545Z June 1967) was

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for guidance only and could be varied as local conditions dictated. Closest points of approach to UAR and ISRAEL were increased to 20 and 15 miles respectively. The record does not indicate the time of receipt of this message by USCINCEUR. However, it was received by CINCUSNAVEUR at 08/1642Z and COMSIXTHFLT at 08/0724Z.

LIBERTY did not receive the message prior to the attack since the message was not received by Naval Communications Station, Asmara until 08/2125Z and broadcasted ten minutes later. It should be noted that JCS message 7347 which is discussed below cancelled this message and that 080110Z was received by the action addressee, USCINCEUR, prior to receipt of 072230Z.

JCS message 7347 080110Z June 1967 was a Top Secret, immediate precedence message addressed to USCINCEUR for action and CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, LIBERTY and others for information. The message requested that LIBERTY comply with operating areas previously imposed on SIXTHFLT units, i. e., not closer than 100 miles to Israel, Syria and Egypt and 25 miles to Cyprus. This message, when transmitted for LIBERTY by the Department of the Army Communications Center, (DACC), was misrouted to Naval Communications Station, Philippines where it was received at 08/0400Z. Naval Communications Station, Philippines personnel then rerouted the

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message to Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/0449Z, however, it was received by DACC at 080502Z and routed by DACC to National Security Agency. The message was not received by Naval Communications Stations, Asmara or Morocco for transmission to LIBERTY. Time of delivery to CINCUSNAVEUR was 08/0312Z. COMSIXTHFLT received the message via Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/0639Z. Time of delivery to USCINCEUR, the action addressee, is not shown in the record, however, this time has been established as 08/0211Z.

USCINCEUR immediate precedence message ECJC/JRC 09045 080625Z June 1967 was addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action and COMSIXTHFLT, LIBERTY and others for information. Reference (a) of this message was a telephone conversation between an officer of the originator's headquarters and CINCUSNAVEUR duty officer which occurred at 080425Z. This conversation is discussed below. Reference (b) was the JCS 100 mile message. The entire text was "This confirms reference A to take reference B FORAC." It has been determined that the time of receipt of this message by CINCUSNAVEUR was 08/0727Z. This message was transmitted on JRTT Fleet Broadcast at 08/1059Z.

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CINCUSNAVEUR immediate precedence message 080455Z June 1967 directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 080110Z June 1967 for action. It has been determined that COMSIXTHFLT received this message 08/0518Z. In addition to sending the message discussed above, the CINCUSNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team, using a teletype conference circuit, passed JCS 080110Z June to COMSIXTHFLT along with a wire-note to take it for action. This occurred at about 08/0440Z.

COMSIXTHFLT immediate precedence message 080917Z June 1967, addressed to LIBERTY for action and sixteen information addressees, directed LIBERTY to proceed immediately to a new operating area and not to approach the coast of the UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 miles and Cyprus closer than 25 miles. This message was transmitted to Naval Communications Station, Morocco at 08/1058Z and entered into the Defense Communications System at 08/1100Z for delivery to Naval Communications Station, Asmara. (LIBERTY was copying the Asmara Fleet Broadcast). After relay by DCS Major Relay Station, Seville (San Pablo) the message was transmitted to DCS Major Relay Station, Asmara where it was erroneously relayed to Naval Communications Station, Greece at 08/1215Z or 08/1238Z (conflict of evidence) from which it was returned to DCS Major Relay Station, Asmara at 08/1503Z\* and then sent to Naval Communications Station

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Asmara from which it was broadcast at 08/1525Z. The first air attack occurred at 08/1203Z.

In addition to, and concurrent with, the record communications discussed above there were a number of telephone conversations/directives between members of the commands concerned which are important in considering the sequence of events.

1. At 07/2350Z there was a VOCOM (secure telephone) from an officer in the Joint Reconnaissance Center, (JRC) Washington, to a member of the CINCUSNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team, in which it was requested that LIBERTY be withdrawn to an operating area not closer than 100 miles from Israel, UAR and Syria. The record further indicates concern by CINCUSNAVEUR personnel since; the call had bypassed USCINCEUR, was not confirmed by a message or date-time group of a message, and they "had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message".

2. At 08/0030Z the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer called and advised a USCINCEUR staff member of the JRC call and requested that the directive be confirmed and a date-time group be provided.

3. At 08/0325Z the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Duty Officer called and requested another USCINCEUR staff member to apprise him

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of action taken on the request made in the 08/0030Z call. Shortly thereafter, the USCINCEUR representative returned the call and provided the date-time group (JCS 080110Z). A copy of JCS message 080110Z was delivered to the CINCUSNAVEUR duty officer coincident with this call. At this time the teletype conference noted above was initiated.

During the air attack, pursuant to an order received in the ship's radio control via the general announcing system, the CINCUSNAVEUR High Command voice net was utilized by LIBERTY to report the attack and the situation as it developed. These transmissions were received by USS SARATOGA and passed to higher authority via Naval Communications Station, Greece. This High Command circuit became the primary means of communication with LIBERTY since LIBERTY carried out destruction procedures of classified material including keying material.

#### DEATHS AND INJURIES

The air and surface attacks on USS LIBERTY resulted in the death of thirty-four persons and injuries to 171 persons. Copies of the death certificates (NAVMED N) of those killed are attached to this summarization as Appendix C. Appendix D to this summary contains

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a list of the injured with diagnosis, prognosis, expected disability and the actual or expected loss of time from duty for each injured person. Pertinent treatment records as obtained by the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery are also contained in Appendix D. It has been determined that as of 21 September 1967, all but ten of the total injured have been returned to a full duty status.

#### MATERIAL DAMAGE

The major material damage to LIBERTY resulted from the torpedo explosion. This explosion resulted in a hole centered at frame 60 and extending 24 feet downward from just below the second deck and longitudinally from frame 53 to frame 66 (39 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape, larger at the bottom. Outboard 15 feet of the first platform and the associated structure were badly damaged. There was lesser damage to the second platform deck. The second deck and frames were buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet. In addition there was major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below the second deck from frame 52 to frame 78 along the entire width of the ship. The two research compartments which extend the entire width of the ship suffered severe structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and facilities were reduced to twisted wreckage.

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Topside damage resulting from aircraft's strafing and rocket attacks and from MTB strafing -- the ship was hit by more than 821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary -- resulted in the pilot house and signal bridge, forward deck house, all gun tubs, many antennas, numerous bulkheads and decks being holed by explosive rockets. The whale boat was destroyed and many life rafts holed or burned. There were numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions. The gyro-compass, air conditioning plant and many minor items of equipment which were located in superstructure spaces were damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personal effects were damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during firefighting.

The total cost to effect repairs of damage to the ship and equipment has been estimated as \$5,612,160.00. Appendix E to this summary contains an itemization of the estimated cost of repairs.

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